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INTRODUCTION 
It has long been understood that an apology can have extraordinary 
emotional and psychological benefits for both the recipient and the person 
giving the apology.1  In recent years, many practical results of apologizing 
                                                 
*  J.D., Summa Cum Laude, Belmont University College of Law (2015).  I would like to 
thank my family—especially my wife, Meg—for all of their support and help.  I would also 
like to thank the entire Belmont Law Review staff for their hard work and dedication. 
 1. See Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology 
into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 87 (2004); Max Bolstad, Learning from Japan: 
The Case for Increased Use of Apology in Mediation, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 545, 545 (2000). 
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have been realized as well.2  In politics, apologies are frequently given by 
leaders in the wake of a wrongdoing or scandal.3  While many of these 
apologies are undoubtedly sincere, they may also serve the dual purpose of 
preventing further media scrutiny.  As recently as February 2014, President 
Obama issued a handwritten apology to a professor after making a 
statement in a speech that devalued art history majors.4  While such 
apologies may not work in every political context, in this case the 
President’s personal touch was effective, leading the professor to reverse 
course from her previous criticisms.5 
Additionally, in the legal context an apology can serve as a useful 
tool in civil litigation.  A sincere apology can help promote judicial 
economy by unlocking stalled settlement negotiations.6  Moreover, when an 
apology is offered at earlier stages in a negotiation, such a statement can 
help ensure that impasse is avoided altogether.7 
Jurisdictions differ in their treatment of apologies; in some 
locations, apologies can even be legally dangerous as the statement may be 
admissible evidence at trial to establish liability or to prove some other 
element of an offense.8  This potential liability leads many attorneys and 
insurance companies to encourage their clients to avoid apologizing 
following an accident.9  Take, for example, a scene from the popular 
television show Parks and Recreation, in which beloved civil servant Leslie 
Knope attempts to apologize to a friend, Andy, after he was injured in an 
accident caused by the city.10  Before Leslie is able to speak with Andy, she 
is discouraged from apologizing by the city attorney.11 
 
Attorney: Hi, Scott Braddock, city attorney. 
                                                 
 2. See Brent T. White, SAY YOU’RE SORRY: COURT-ORDERED APOLOGIES AS 
A CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDY, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1261, 1269 (2006) (citing Lee Taft, 
Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135 (2000); Deborah 
L. Levi, Note, The Role of Apology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165 (1997)). 
 3. See Robert R. Weyeneth, The Power of Apology and the Process of Historical 
Reconciliation, 23 THE PUBLIC HISTORIAN 9, 12 (2001). 
 4. The President stated, “[a] lot of young people no longer see the trades and skilled 
manufacturing as a viable career, but I promise you, folks can make a lot more potentially 
with skilled manufacturing or the trades than they might with an art-history degree.” Geoff 
Earle, Obama Apologizes to Art Teacher for Mocking Art-History Degrees, NEW YORK POST 
(Feb. 18, 2014), available at http://nypost.com/2014/02/18/obama-apologizes-to-art-teacher-
for-mocking-art-history-degrees/. 
 5. Id. The professor later indicated on her Facebook page that she loves Obama and 
now feels badly about the whole incident. Id. 
 6. See Bolstad, supra note 1, at 569. 
 7. See id. 
 8. Jeffrey S. Helmreich, Does ‘Sorry’ Incriminate? Evidence, Harm and the 
Protection of Apology, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 567, 568–69 (2012). 
 9. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apology-Help or Hindrance?, 10 No. 3 DISP. RESOL. 
MAG., Spring 2004, at 33, 33 [hereinafter Apology]. 
 10. Parks and Recreation: Kaboom (NBC television broadcast Oct. 22, 2009). 
 11. Id. 
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Leslie: Hey Scott, I didn’t know that you were friends with Andy. 
Attorney: I never met him.  What I do know is that he could sue us 
at the drop of a hat. I mean, right now he is the most dangerous man in [the 
city]. 
Leslie: Is that all you lawyers think about?  Lawsuits, and laws, and 
legalese?  
Attorney: Yes.  
Leslie: You can relax.  All I’m going do is go in and just say, 
“We’re so sorry, it’s entirely our fault.” 
Attorney: No, no, no.  You can’t say any of that. It admits liability.  
You can’t say “I’m sorry,” or “I apologize.”  It implies guilt. 
Leslie: That’s insane, I have to apologize.  Andy was the victim . . . 
Attorney: Can’t say victim. 
Leslie: . . . of an extremely unfortunate situation. 
Attorney: Can’t say “unfortunate” and you can’t say “situation.” 
Leslie: I can’t say the word “situation?” 
Attorney: No it implies there was a situation.12 
 
While this fictional example may be slightly hyperbolic, the advice 
given by the attorney above does not differ greatly from that of real 
attorneys in many situations, many of whom fear that the statement will be 
admitted as proof of liability. 
One situation in which an attorney may advise a client against 
apologizing is when an incident gives rise to a federal civil suit.  Currently, 
the Federal Rules of Evidence do not contain a provision specifically 
providing evidentiary protection for apologies.  While some apologies may 
be excluded under Rule 408, which protects certain conduct or statements 
made during compromise negotiations, this rule contains a variety of 
limitations and, as a result, many apologetic statements are admissible as 
evidence.13 
Recognizing the benefits of apologizing and the legal danger of 
doing so, a number of states have adopted legislation and rules providing 
evidentiary protection for apologies made by those who have caused 
another individual harm in certain situations.14  These statutes take on a 
variety of forms and offer different levels of protection.  The majority of 
these state statutes provide evidentiary protection for expressions of a 
general sense of sympathy or benevolence, i.e. “partial apologies.”15  Such 
                                                 
 12. Id. 
 13. FED. R. EVID. 408; Daniel W. Shuman, The Role of Apology in Tort Law, 83 
JUDICATURE 180, 188 (2000). 
 14. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Attorneys, Apologies, and Settlement Negotiation, 13 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 349, 354–56 (2008). 
 15. See Edward A. Dauer, Apology in the Aftermath of Injury: Colorado’s “I’m Sorry 
Law,” 35 COLO. LAW. 47, 47 (2005).  For partial apology statutes that apply only in the 
context of medical malpractice see ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.544 (2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
10, § 4318 (2014); D.C. CODE § 16-2841 (2014); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-207 (2014); LA. 
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statutes protect statements like, “I am sorry this happened to you.”16  
Several states have created statutes that go further and extend protection to 
fault admitting statements, i.e. “full apologies,” in the limited context of 
medical malpractice.17  Unlike partial apology statutes, these state statutes 
also protect statements like, “I’m sorry that I did this to you.”18 
Scholars and commentators are divided as to their treatment of 
these approaches.19  Some argue that the law should not provide any 
evidentiary protection for apologies because such protection will exclude 
evidence probative of fault, discourage apologies, and undermine the 
sincerity of these apologies.20  Others argue that U.S. law will be enriched 
by the protection of apologies, specifically “full apology” statements, 
because such statements promote judicial economy by encouraging 
settlement.21  These commentators argue that a full apology is much more 
likely than a partial apology, or no apology, to facilitate settlement because 
                                                                                                                 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3715.5 (2014); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24, § 2907 (2014); MD. CODE 
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-920 (West 2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2155 (2014); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-1201 (2014); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.43 (West 2014); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 8.01-52.1 (2013). For partial apology statutes that apply broadly see CAL. 
EVID. CODE § 1160 (West 2014); FLA. STAT. § 90.4026 (2014); HAW. REV. STAT. § 626-1, R. 
409.5 (2014); IND. CODE § 34-43.5-1-4 (2014); MO. REV. STAT. § 538.229 (2014); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 507-E:4 (West 2014); TENN. R. EVID. 409.1 (2014); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. 
CODE ANN. § 18.061 (West 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-422 (West 2013). Note that 
several of these statutes do not expressly exclude statements of fault but have been 
interpreted by courts as doing so. See Lawrence v. MountainStar Healthcare, 320 P.3d 1037, 
1051 (Utah Ct. App. 2014); see also Davis v. Wooster Orthopaedics & Sports Med., Inc. 952 
N.E.2d 1216, 1218, 1220–21 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011) (holding that state statutes ambiguously 
prohibiting admission of statements expressing “apology” or a “general sense of 
benevolence” do not include prohibitions on statements of fault). The following statutes also 
appear to impliedly protect only partial apologies but have not yet been the subject of 
litigation: IOWA CODE § 622.31 (2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 23D (2014); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 26-1-814 (2014); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 413 (2014); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 31-04-12 (2013); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-1708.1H (2014); OR. REV. STAT. § 677.082 
(2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-12-14 (2014); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-11a (2014); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 1-1-130 (2014). 
 16. Dauer, supra note 15 at 47. 
 17. Id. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2605 (2013); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-135 
(2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-184d (2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-416 (2014); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 19-1-190 (2014); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1912 (2014); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 5.64.010 (2014); WIS. STAT. § 904.14 (2014). 
 18. Dauer, supra note 15 at 47. 
 19. Compare Lucinda E. Jesson & Peter B. Knapp, My Lawyer Told Me to Say I’m 
Sorry: Lawyers, Doctors, And Medical Apologies, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1410, 1411 
(2009) (exhibiting skepticism that evidentiary rules can influence human behavior and 
arguing that such rules undercut the moral weight of apologies), with Jonathan R. Cohen, 
Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009, 1068 (1999) (discussing the 
emotional and strategic benefits apologizing may bring to clients when done in a “safe” legal 
means) [hereinafter Advising Clients]. 
 20. See Jesson & Knapp, supra note 19, at 1438. 
 21. Michael B. Runnels, Apologies All Around: Advocating Federal Protection for the 
Full Apology in Civil Cases, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 137, 145 (2009). 
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fault-admitting, full apologies are viewed as more sincere expressions of 
remorse.22 
This note seeks to strike a balance between these two positions by 
advocating for the approach adopted by a majority of states: evidentiary 
protection for some, but not all apologies.  Such an approach, while not 
perfect, aligns the competing interests of encouraging the legal, 
psychological, and emotional benefits that accompany apologies with 
preserving a plaintiff’s right to utilize probative evidence.  By way of 
introduction, section one of this note briefly discusses the current legal 
treatment of apologies in United States jurisdictions.  Section two compares 
the advantages of excluding apologetic statements from evidence with the 
disadvantages of such evidentiary protection and further describes how a 
balance may be achieved between these two positions.  Section three seeks 
to incorporate this balance into the Federal Rules of Evidence by proposing 
an amendment to specifically grant evidentiary protection for certain 
apologies. 
I. THE EVOLVING TREATMENT OF APOLOGIES 
The meaning of the word “apology” has changed significantly since 
its origins in the sixteenth century.23  While today most think of an apology 
as including expressions of regret and sympathy, admissions of 
responsibility, and promises of forbearance, the term once did not confer 
such meaning.24  The word “apology” originates from the Greek word 
“apologia,” meaning, “to speak in one’s defense.”25  In this original 
meaning, a person offering an apology was not expressing regret for his 
actions, but was seeking to justify his behavior and to defend himself from 
accusations.26  In this sense, the word apology was more synonymous with 
“excuse” than today’s typical, “I’m sorry.”27 
Soon after its introduction, however, the meaning of apology 
changed from self-justification towards implying regret.28  It was first used 
to “describe the process of excusing oneself from the wrath of a person 
                                                 
 22. See generally id. 
 23. See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 553 (2d 1989). 
 24. Bolstad, supra note 1, at 546 (citing OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 553 (2d 
1989)); JAY FOLBERG, DWIGHT GOLANN, THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH & LISA A KLOPPENBERG, 
RESOLVING DISPUTES THEORY, PRACTICE, AND LAW 156 (Aspen Publishers, 2d ed. 2010). 
 25. Bolstad, supra note 1, at 546 (citing OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 553 (2d 
1989)). 
 26. Michael Quinion, Apology, WORLD WIDE WORDS, 
http://www.worldwidewords.org/topicalwords/tw-apo1.htm (last modified Jan. 17, 1998). 
The first use of the word “apology” recorded in the Oxford English Dictionary is in the title 
Apologie or Syr Thomas More, Knyght; made by him, after he had geuen ouer the Officer of 
Lord Chancellor of Englande, dated 1533. Id. In this usage, Sir Thomas More was not 
regretting his actions, but was offering a justification. Id. 
 27. See id. 
 28. Id. 
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affected by one’s actions” and conferred the sentiment that no offense was 
intended.29  Then, the term shifted to embrace our modern definition and 
was an acknowledgement that some offense had in fact been given and was 
an expression of regret for such an offense.30 
Presently, our society encourages apologies from an early age.31  
Children are taught early to “say you’re sorry,” in the understanding that an 
apology can be a powerful tool in restoring and maintaining social 
relationships.32  However in the United States, the benefits of apologizing 
learned as a child are often forgotten by the time one becomes an adult.33 
In fact, Americans apologize much less frequently than do 
members of other societies.34  For instance, in Japan apologies are an 
integral part of the mutual interdependence and hierarchical relations that 
are hallmarks of Japanese culture.35  Apologizing is a sign of an 
individual’s desire to restore or maintain a positive relationship with the 
other party despite a temporary disruption to the relationship.36  
Exemplifying this belief is the Japanese practice of apologizing even when 
one thinks that the other party is at fault.37 
The societal preference for apologies in Japan is recognized and 
encouraged through Japanese civil law in several ways.38  First, Japan is a 
nation with a history of promoting the use of various methods of alternative 
dispute resolution.39  In these non-litigation scenarios, there is little 
emphasis on determining fault, but rather the goal is to preserve the long-
term relationship between the parties.40  Second, when cases do reach 
litigation, “there is evidence that Japanese judges do not see the offering of 
an apology as an admission of liability.”41  Thus, apologies are freely given 
following an accident because parties are less worried about their 
statements being used as an admission of fault.42 
Conversely, apologies in the United States are less frequent than in 
Japanese society.43  Americans seem to save the most extravagant, 
apologetic language, words like “I beg your pardon,” for those situations 
“which are least serious, such as when one bumps into a stranger on the 
                                                 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Bolstad, supra note 1, at 547. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See id. at 545. 
 35. Id. at 553. 
 36. Bolstad, supra note 1, at 553. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See id. at 559–60. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See id. at 560. 
 41. Bolstad, supra note 1, at 559. 
 42. See id. 
 43. Id. 
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street.”44  Additionally, consistent with the historical definitions of the word 
“apology,” the American apology is more likely accompanied by an excuse 
or explanation of why the behavior in question occurred than are Japanese 
apologies.45  At times, American society even takes a hostile view of an 
apology, viewing apologies as a sign of weakness.46  For example, one 
political scientist commented, “To apologize for substantive things you’ve 
done raises the white flag.  There is a school of thought in politics that you 
never say you’re sorry. The best defense is a good offense.”47 
Also, as mentioned above, unlike the Japanese legal system, 
apologies can be legally dangerous in many United States jurisdictions.48  
Such statements are ordinarily admissible in court to prove liability or 
another element of a claim.49  This has led many lawyers to advise clients to 
avoid post-accident apologies in order to prevent contributing to liability 
judgments.50  However, despite this tendency to admit apologies into 
evidence, there are a variety of rules, depending on the jurisdiction and 
circumstance that may limit the admissibility of an apology as evidence.  
These rules vary from no evidentiary protection for apologies under the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, to protection for “partial apologies” in a number 
of states, and, finally, protection for “fault-admitting” apologies in a few 
jurisdictions. 
A. Apologies under the Federal Rules of Evidence 
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence (“FRE”) little, if any, 
evidentiary protection is provided to apologies.  On the contrary, the rules 
provide that apologies are generally admissible to prove the liability of the 
apologizer.51  FRE 801(d)(2) states that admissions by a party-opponent are 
“not hearsay,” and, therefore, are not excluded by the rule against hearsay 
when offered against that party.52  Thus, even though an apology fits within 
the classic definition of hearsay, an out of court statement offered to prove 
the truth of the matter asserted, it is admissible under the Federal Rules as 
non-hearsay.53  This rule allows a party-opponent’s apology into evidence 
regardless of whether the apology actually “admits” anything in the course 
of apologizing.54  Rule 801(d)(2) defines an “admission” by a party-
                                                 
 44. Id. at 561. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Bolstad, supra note 1, at 563. 
 47. Id. (quoting Deborah Tannen, I’m Sorry, I Won’t Apologize, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 
1996, at 6, 34). 
 48. Id. at 559. See Jonathan R. Cohen, Legislating Apology: The Pros and Cons, 70 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 819, 824–25 (2002) [hereinafter Legislating Apology]. 
 49. Id. at 824. 
 50. Helmreich, supra note 8, at 573. 
 51. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Legislating Apology, supra note 48, at 824–25. 
 54. Id. at 825. 
250 BELMONT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2: 243 
opponent as, among other things, “the party’s own statement, in either an 
individual or a representative capacity.”55  Thus, an apology by a party-
opponent is admissible non-hearsay regardless of whether it admits any 
fault.56 
However, despite the general admissibility of apologies, there are 
several rules under the FRE that may preclude an apology from admission. 
FRE 501 provides that, “in a civil case, state law governs privilege 
regarding a claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule of 
decision.”57  Thus, where an apology is made in a situation covered under a 
state privilege, such as mediation, and is being offered in a federal civil 
case not grounded on a federal question, such a statement may be excluded 
from admissibility.58 
Additionally, and perhaps most importantly for purposes of 
discussion here, FRE 408 provides in part that, “Evidence of conduct or 
statements made in a compromise negotiation is . . . not admissible [to 
prove liability for or invalidity of a claim or its amount].”59  Under this rule, 
evidence of settlement or attempted settlement of a disputed claim is 
inadmissible when offered as an admission of liability.60  Thus, if an 
apology fits within the parameters of this rule, it is not admissible as 
evidence. 
FRE 408 was created with the purpose of “encourag[ing] 
settlements which would be discouraged if such evidence were 
admissible.”61  Under the common law, statements made in the course of 
settlement negotiations were admissible in court unless they were made in 
hypothetical form, preceded by the terms “without prejudice,” or so 
intertwined with an offer of settlement as to be inseparable from it.62  As a 
result of the disadvantages that accompanied these required legal 
formalisms, such as inhibiting settlement and compromising 
communications, FRE 408 was created to expand the confidentiality of 
private statements made during settlement negotiations and to set the 
benchmark that settlement negotiations are inadmissible with or without 
such legal formalisms.63 
                                                 
 55. Id. at 824 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)) (emphasis added). 
 56. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). 
 57. Legislating Apology, supra note 48, at 825; FED. R. EVID. 501. 
 58. Legislating Apology, supra note 48, at 825.  The rationale underlying FRE 501 is 
that, in accordance with Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), “federal law should 
not supersede that of the States in substantive areas such as privilege absent a compelling 
reason.” FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory committee’s notes.  The advisory committee believed 
that in civil cases not grounded upon a federal question, there would be no such compelling 
reason to supersede state law. Id. 
 59. Legislating Apology, supra note 48, at 825–26 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 408). 
 60. FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s notes. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Advising Clients, supra note 19, at 1033. 
 63. Id. at 1033–34; Bolstad, supra note 1, at 572. 
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However, FRE 408 is not without its limitations, and some scholars 
have suggested that it has fallen short of its goal of promoting private 
settlements.64  First, FRE 408 bars statements made during settlement 
negotiations from introduction at trial, but does not cover pre-trial 
discovery or administrative or legislative hearings.65  An apology made 
during a mediation or settlement negotiation is admissible in those 
scenarios.66  Additionally, FRE 408 does not protect a party from revealing 
such an apology to the public at large outside of the courtroom.67  This 
loophole has the potential to become a significant deterrent to apologizing, 
especially in situations with large corporate entities who may wish to avoid 
negative publicity. 
Second, FRE 408 only excludes the admission into evidence of 
conduct or statements, such as apologies, when such conduct or statements 
are offered, “to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim 
or to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction . . . .”68  
FRE 408 explicitly provides that such evidence is admissible, “for another 
purpose, such as proving a witness’s bias or prejudice, negating a 
contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal 
investigation or prosecution.”69  Re-emphasizing this point, the advisory 
committee acknowledges extensive case law recognizing that FRE 408 is 
inapplicable when compromising evidence is offered for a purpose other 
than to prove the validity, invalidity, or amount of a disputed claim.70  
Therefore, if an apology is offered for one of these other reasons, it is 
admissible as evidence. 
                                                 
 64. See Advising Clients, supra note 19, at 1034. 
 65. Bolstad, supra note 1, at 572. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 573. 
 68. FED. R. EVID. 408. 
 69. Id. Prior to the 2006 amendment of FRE 408, compromise evidence was 
admissible to impeach by contradiction or inconsistent statement. See Advising Clients, 
supra note 19, at 1034.  Thus, “if a defendant who admitted his guilt when apologizing 
during settlement negotiations were later to deny his guilt at trial, the earlier admission likely 
could be used against him for impeachment.” Id. at 1035.  However, because “[s]uch broad 
impeachment would tend to swallow the exclusionary rule and would impair the public 
policy of promoting settlements,” FRE 408 was amended to prohibit use of such evidence 
for this purpose. FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s notes. 
 70. FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s notes. See, e.g., Athey v. Farmers Ins. 
Exch., 234 F.3d 357, 362 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that evidence of settlement offer by 
insurer was properly admitted to prove insurer’s bad faith); Coakley & Williams v. 
Structural Concrete Equip., 973 F.2d 349, 353–54 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that evidence of 
settlement is not precluded by Rule 408 where offered to prove a party’s intent with respect 
to the scope of a release); Cates v. Morgan Portable Bldg. Corp., 708 F.2d 683, 691 (7th Cir. 
1985) (explaining that Rule 408 does not bar evidence of a settlement when offered to prove 
a breach of the settlement agreement, as the purpose of the evidence is to prove the fact of 
settlement as opposed to the validity or amount of the underlying claim); Uforma/Shelby 
Bus. Forms, Inc. v. NLRB, 111 F.3d 1284, 1294 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding threats made in 
settlement negotiations were admissible because Rule 408 is inapplicable when the claim is 
based upon a wrong that is committed during the course of settlement negotiations). 
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Third, FRE 408 can only be used by parties to litigation.71  
Apologies made by individuals who are not parties to a case may be 
admitted under any circumstances without violation of FRE 408.72  This 
lack of protection “could create serious problems for the apologizer, with 
the possible result of being forced to defend numerous other suits inspired 
by the revelation of the apology” in court.73 
Finally, FRE 408 only protects apologetic conduct or statements if 
the conduct or statements constitute, or are made in pursuit of, a 
compromise to a dispute on either the validity or amount of a claim.74  It is 
not always clear, however, as to exactly what constitutes a “compromise 
negotiation” and whether a dispute exists as to the validity or amount of a 
claim.  Certainly, once a legal claim has been filed, FRE 408 will apply, but 
it is unclear whether a statement made before a claim has been filed will be 
considered “made during” a compromise negotiation of a disputed claim.75  
For instance, a spontaneous apology in a parking lot following a fender-
bender might not qualify.76  This seemingly “gray area” is a substantial 
limitation to any evidentiary protection afforded to apologies by FRE 408, 
as the issue of whether a certain statement occurred during a “compromise 
negotiation” is up for varying interpretations by courts in differing 
jurisdictions. 
B. State Apology Laws 
Contrary to the “all-inclusive” Federal Rules of Evidence, states 
vary in their approaches to evidentiary protection of apologies. While most 
state rules of evidence have provisions analogous to FRE 408, a great 
number of states provide other mechanisms for protecting apologetic 
statements such as evidentiary rules and confidentiality statutes.  These 
state rules vary in the scope of their protection and in the circumstances 
such protection is offered. 
i. State Rules of Evidence 
As of the time of this note, thirty-seven states and the District of 
Columbia have enacted statutes or evidentiary rules promoting apologies by 
providing express evidentiary protection for such statements in some, but 
not all, situations.77  This trend towards protecting apologies began in 1986 
when Massachusetts became the first state to adopt an evidentiary rule 
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specifically excluding certain types of apologetic statements from 
admissibility when used to prove liability in civil cases.78  The 
Massachusetts statute provides in part: 
Statements, writings or benevolent gestures expressing 
sympathy or a general sense of benevolence relating to the 
pain, suffering or death of a person involved in an accident 
and made to such person or to the family of such person 
shall be inadmissible as evidence of an admission of 
liability in a civil action.79 
One issue left unresolved after the passage of this statute, however, 
is the scope of apologetic statements protected from admissibility.80  The 
statute most certainly protects statements like, “I hope you feel better 
soon.”81  However, the law is unclear as to whether it covers statements 
where fault is embedded within an expression of sympathy or benevolence, 
such as, “I’m sorry that you are hurt,” or “I am sorry that I hurt you.”82 
After passage of the Massachusetts apology statute, many states 
followed suit creating apology rules of their own.83  These state statutes 
resolve the question regarding the scope of protection with more clarity.84  
Thirty of the thirty-eight jurisdictions that have adopted apology statutes 
limit protection to “partial apologies.”85  Under these statutes, an apology 
that expresses sympathy or benevolence after an accident is excluded from 
evidence, but portions of an apology that include an embedded admission of 
fault are admissible to prove liability.86  Apologies containing portions that 
express benevolence and sympathy and portions that express fault will most 
likely be parsed, if possible, with the fault admitting sections admissible.87 
These partial apology states vary with regard to the types of cases 
for which they offer evidentiary protection.  Eleven states exclude 
qualifying apologies generally in the context of civil litigation when such 
statements are offered as evidence of liability.88  For example, Texas 
adopted a statute with similar language as the Massachusetts rule, but its 
statute additionally provides that, “a communication . . . which also 
includes a statement or statements concerning negligence or culpable 
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conduct pertaining to an accident or event, is admissible to prove liability of 
the communicator.”89 
Additionally, eighteen “partial apology” states, and the District of 
Columbia, have statutes that offer protection for medical malpractice 
liability only.90  For example, Delaware’s apology statute provides in part 
that: 
Any and all statements, writings, gestures, or affirmations 
made by a health care provider or an employee of a health 
care provider that express apology (other than an 
expression or admission of liability or fault), sympathy, 
compassion, condolence, or benevolence . . . are 
inadmissible in a civil action that is brought against a 
health care provider.91 
This statute provides evidentiary protection to a doctor who expresses his 
sympathy to a family in the wake of medical malpractice, but does not 
apply to car accidents, slip-and-fall cases, or other types of civil litigation.92 
Recently, a few states have begun to provide evidentiary protection 
for fault-admitting or “full,” apologies.93  For example, Colorado’s apology 
statute covers, “gestures, or conduct expressing apology, fault, sympathy, 
commiseration, condolence, compassion, or a general sense of 
benevolence[.]”94  Unlike partial apology statutes, this rule protects a 
statement like, “Gosh I’m sorry I did this to you,” in addition to any general 
expressions of sympathy.95  Notably, however, Colorado’s statute applies 
only to civil actions alleging liability for unanticipated outcomes in health 
care and to statements made by “a health care provider or an employee of a 
health care provider” to an alleged victim.96  Arizona, Connecticut, 
Georgia, South Carolina, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin also have 
statutes protecting “full apologies,” but these statutes also apply exclusively 
to medical malpractice.97 
Regardless of what litigation scenario these statutes cover or 
whether they cover partial or full apologies, all thirty-seven state apology 
statutes and rules reflect their respective state legislatures’ beliefs that 
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protecting some, but not all, apologies is beneficial to the judicial system 
and society as a whole.98  In fact, as of the time of this note, no state has a 
statute allowing for the protection of apologies in all situations.  By 
allowing protection for apologies in limited situations, these legislatures 
have achieved a balance between two competing interests: (1) encouraging 
apologies and (2) preserving a plaintiff’s right to utilize probative evidence 
of liability.99  This balancing approach has proven successful as the number 
of states with protection for some, but not all, apologies continues to 
grow.100 
ii. State Confidentiality Statutes 
In addition to providing protection for apologies through 
evidentiary exclusion, many states have confidentiality statutes that provide 
privileges for statements made during mediation.101  These privilege 
statutes vary significantly from state to state in several ways, however.102  
First, the scope of the privilege created by these statutes varies from statutes 
that cover all communications made during mediation, to statutes that limit 
the scope of information that is privileged, to only statements which are 
relevant to the issue being mediated.103  For example, Washington and 
Virginia have created specific subject-matter exceptions to their privilege 
statutes.104  Second, these privilege statutes “vary according to whose 
statements are covered.”105  In many states the privilege applies to all 
mediation participants, but in other states, “only information originating 
with the mediator or mediation program is privileged.” 106 
Additionally, some states have opted against creating absolute 
privileges for mediation.  Instead, they have allowed the courts to develop 
the privilege through a case-by-case analysis, in which the courts balance 
the costs and benefits of a mediation privilege in a specific scenario.107  
However, as one scholar points out, courts “have historically been loathe to 
expand privileges,” therefore, relying on judicial review to create such a 
privilege may very well be an arduous process.108  Also, conflict of law 
issues can create problems for parties who wish to rely on mediation 
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privileges for apologetic statements.109  Because the local law of the forum 
will determine whether the privilege applies, a situation could arise in 
which “a mediator or a party to a mediation in a state with an absolute 
mediation privilege is subpoenaed by a party in a state with no mediation 
confidentiality statute.”110  Further, as discussed above, FRE 501 provides 
that in federal diversity cases the state’s privilege rules will apply, while in 
federal question cases, statements made during mediation will not be 
protected.111 
Therefore, while mediation privileges can be trusted in some 
instances to prevent disclosure of apologetic statements made during 
mediation, the situation in many jurisdictions remains unclear and 
potentially risky.112 
C. Private Contractual Agreements 
Finally, parties to dispute resolution procedures, such as mediation, 
frequently enter into confidentiality agreements through which they are able 
to address a variety of matters.113  Unlike federal and state statutory 
protections, these contractual arrangements not only make statements made 
during mediation inadmissible in court, but can also prevent the parties 
from revealing these statements to the public or to other third-parties.114 
However, there are several weaknesses to the use of confidentiality 
agreements; thus, reliance on these agreements is undesirable in many 
situations.  Courts frequently “disregard clauses within confidentiality 
agreements that purport to preclude a court from hearing evidence as being 
contrary to public policy.”115  Additionally, even if a contract is 
enforceable, the penalties for breaching the contract may not be a sufficient 
deterrent to prevent someone from publicly revealing the apologetic 
statement if the stakes are high enough.116  “Finally, contractual agreements 
are not binding on third parties and therefore provide no protection from 
claims and revelations made by those not party to the mediation.”117 
II. BALANCING THE PROS AND CONS OF APOLOGIES AS EVIDENCE 
Legal scholars and commentators have reached differing 
conclusions as to the merits of granting evidentiary protection to 
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apologies.118  While some commentators argue that the all-inclusive Federal 
Rules of Evidence currently provide the best strategy for maintaining a 
plaintiff’s ability to use probative evidence, others cite the judicial economy 
and social benefits accompanying apologies and contend that jurisdictions 
should amend their rules to exclude all apologies from evidence.119  
Although both of these arguments certainly have their merits, this note 
proposes that the best approach available is the middle ground. 
The benefits of the middle ground approach are exemplified in the 
balance that has been achieved in a growing number of state statutes that 
provide protection for some, but not all, apologies.  Specifically, this note 
proposes that the most idyllic balance can be seen in those statutes that 
exclude expressions of general benevolence, but do not prevent statements 
that are clear admissions of fault from introduction into evidence.120  Before 
further considering the merits of the partial apology balance, this note 
considers several foundational questions.  First, should the government 
encourage individuals to apologize for wrongs they have caused by 
providing evidentiary protection for such apologies?  Second, if so, what 
level of evidentiary protection is appropriate? 
A. Should the Law Encourage Apologies? 
The first foundational question warranting resolution is whether the 
law should attempt to encourage individuals to apologize by providing any 
degree of evidentiary protection.  Several commentators have argued 
against the adoption of evidentiary exclusions for apologies based on a 
variety of reasons.121  Among these reasons, commentators argue that 
“evidentiary exclusions rob apologies of their moral content and, in doing 
so, undermine the sincerity and . . . healing efficacy of apologies.”122  In 
other words, by offering incentives to apologize, apologies are de-valued 
and less authentic.  While these concerns are legitimate, the numerous 
benefits that apologies provide for both the apologizer and the person 
receiving the apology are so great that any devaluation to the apology is 
offset by these gains.  As discussed below, the admission of apologies as 
evidence tends to discourage future apologies, therefore, adoption of 
statutes designed to promote apologies is not only wise, but should be 
encouraged. 
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i. The Benefits of Apologies 
In determining whether jurisdictions should attempt to encourage 
individuals to apologize through evidentiary privileges and exclusions, it is 
first important to understand the benefits provided by such apologies.123  
While apologies do not affect every situation or individual equally, such 
statements tend to provide positive psychological, emotional, and legal 
outcomes for both the apologizer and person receiving the apology.124 
First, apologies have the tendency to provide positive emotional 
and psychological consequences for both the person apologizing and the 
recipient of the apology by adding value to dispute resolution.125  Professor 
Cohen, of Florida, Levin College of Law, an early advocate for the benefits 
of apologies, notes: 
After an injury, it is easy for parties to see the world in 
zero-sum terms.  Having been harmed, the injured party 
may view the offender as an adversary, and expect that 
what will be one side’s gain will be the other side’s loss.  
The offender may fear such hostility from the injured party, 
and may also adopt a zero-sum mind set.  Further, post-
injury negotiations, like all negotiations, inevitably involve 
a distributive element.  Often that distributive element is 
quite large.  For example, following a car accident, the 
central question may be how much compensation the 
defendant’s insurance company will pay to the injured 
party.126 
Professor Cohen continues by observing that, while an apology does not 
always eliminate these distributive elements, it can add value to the 
situation by creating benefits for both parties.127  For example, “[i]f the 
parties knew one another before the injury, an apology may be an important 
first step toward repairing their relationship.”128  Apologies may 
additionally “help the injured party to feel less angry and the injurer to feel 
less guilty” in certain situations.129 
Professor Cohen also states that apology and forgiveness may offer 
the benefit of promoting spiritual and psychological growth.130  “Within 
many religious and ethical systems, offering an apology for one’s 
wrongdoing is an important part of moral behavior, as is forgiving those 
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who have caused offense.”131  Within such systems, when an individual 
apologizes for, rather than denies or avoids, the damage he has caused 
someone else, that individual becomes a better person.132  Furthermore, 
psychologically, when an offender fails to apologize, they may suffer by 
harboring guilt, and when an injured party does not receive an apology, 
they may suffer by storing anger.133 
Second, apologies can provide benefits that are largely strategic, 
rather than value-creating.134  Namely, apologies tend to prevent long legal 
battles.135  According to several empirical studies, if apologies are given 
early enough, they can help prevent lawsuits from being filed altogether.136  
For example, in one British study, many plaintiffs who sued their doctors 
said they would not have done so had they received an apology and an 
explanation for their injury.137  While these results are certainly not 
universal, they suggest that in many situations, compensation or other 
substantive considerations may in fact be secondary to an apology and 
resulting forgiveness. 
Additionally, an apology, even if not full or perfect, can unlock a 
stalled negotiation and facilitate settlement in situations where lawsuits 
arise.  In fact, the University of Michigan Health Service (UMHS) reported 
that its per case payments decreased by 47% and the settlement time 
dropped from twenty to six months after the introduction of the “Apology 
and Disclosure Program,” which required that healthcare professionals 
apologize to patients who complained of being injured while under the 
UMHS care.138  Another highly publicized example is the apology from 
basketball star Kobe Bryant during the course of rape accusations in 
2004.139  Whether Mr. Bryant’s apology was a genuine, benevolent gesture 
or the result of careful drafting and negotiation by attorneys, the result 
remains the same: providing an apology helped Mr. Bryant avoid criminal 
charges and lengthy, expensive civil litigation.140 
ii. The “Chilling Effects” of Admissibility of Apologies 
The next topic to consider in determining whether jurisdictions 
should strive to promote apologies through evidentiary protection is the 
effect that the absence of protection has on an individual’s tendency to 
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apologize.  The largest effect of admitting apologies into evidence is the 
deterrent factor on the practice of apologizing.141  A prime example of this 
phenomenon can be seen by examining the unfortunate situation which led 
to the wave of apology legislation discussed above.  The Massachusetts 
apology statute, the first of its kind, was passed when former Massachusetts 
state senator William L. Saltonstall convinced his successor, Robert C. 
Buell, to draft the bill after Saltonstall’s daughter was killed in a car 
accident and the offending driver never apologized or expressed regret.142 
Senator Saltonstall discovered that the driver had wanted to apologize but 
feared that “it would be used against him as tort evidence.”143  “It was this 
chilling effect of evidence law that the former state senator and his 
successor sought to reverse with the new legislation.”144 
Such reluctance to apologize is often supported by advice that 
individuals receive from legal consultations.145  “Many lawyers do not 
realize that there are legally ‘safe’ ways to apologize.”146  Furthermore, 
many lawyers may advise against apologizing because apologizing runs 
counter to their “macho” strategy of lawyering, in which the lawyer prefers 
to defeat their adversary in a courtroom battle rather than respond with 
humility.147  Finally, lawyers may advise against apologizing due to loss 
aversion.148  When faced with the option of (1) apologizing and taking a 
small but certain loss and (2) not apologizing and gambling with the chance 
of a very large loss or no loss at all, many attorneys will choose the 
gamble.149 
Considering the range of benefits that an apology can provide, in 
addition to the negative effects that admitting apologies into evidence can 
have on the practice of apologizing, states and the federal government 
would be well served by creating legislation, or amending existing 
legislation, to promote apologies. 
B. What Level of Evidentiary Protection is Appropriate? 
Therefore, if the law should encourage apologies through creating 
rules that exclude apologies from admission into evidence, then the 
question remains—what is the appropriate level of evidentiary protection 
for such apologies?  Specifically, should such protection be extended to 
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full, fault-admitting, apologies, or should the partial apology approach of 
the majority of states be taken? 
i. Empirical Arguments for Full Apologies 
A number of legal scholars have advocated protection for full, 
fault-admitting, apologies.150  One such scholar, Professor Jennifer 
Robbennolt, conducted an empirical study on the role of apology in 
settlements that was published in 2003.151  In “her study[,] participants read 
an accident scenario, were assigned the role of accident victim[,] and 
evaluated a settlement offer from the other party.”152  Some offers included 
“full” apologies with expressions of sympathy and admissions of fault, 
while others included only “partial apologies” and expression of sympathy 
with no acceptance of responsibility.153  Others included no apology at 
all.154  Professor Robbennolt’s results indicate that when no apology was 
offered, 52% of participants said that they would either definitely or 
probably accept the offer, 43% said that they would reject it, and 5% were 
uncertain.155  When a full apology was provided, 73% of participants said 
that they would accept the offer, around 13% said they would reject the 
offer, and 14% remained uncertain.156  When a partial apology was offered, 
the results became much more varied.  In this case, 40% of participants 
remained undecided as to what course of action to take, while 35% of 
participants were inclined to accept the offer.157  Although not as low as the 
full apology results, the number of participants inclined to reject the offer 
dropped, as compared to when no apology was offered, to 25%.158 
Professor Robbennolt’s results demonstrate the value apologies 
have in dispute resolution. Robbennolt counters the argument that 
evidentiary protection for apologies will negatively affect apologies by 
stating, “[t]here is . . . no evidence to suggest that protected apologies will 
be less effective or less valued by claimants than unprotected apologies.”159 
She continues, “[a]ccordingly, providing evidentiary protection for 
apologies may serve to encourage the offering of apologies . . . without 
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diminishing the value and effectiveness of apologies so offered.”160 
Professor Robbennolt argues, however, that current state statutes are 
protecting the wrong types of apologies.161  She states that while the 
majority of current statutes protect partial apologies and those portions of 
full apologies that do not admit responsibility, it is the “full, responsibility-
accepting, apologies that have a positive impact on settlement decision-
making[.]”162 
ii. The Negative Aspects of Excluding Fault-Admitting Apologies 
Although it is difficult to argue with the results of Professor 
Robbennolt’s empirical analysis, and while full apologies most certainly 
provide the greatest settlement opportunities and emotional benefits, these 
added benefits must be considered in light of several negative aspects of 
evidentiary protection for fault-admitting apologies.  Specifically, plaintiffs 
and the justice system as a whole will be disserved by prohibiting the 
admission of statements into evidence that are often highly probative of 
liability or fault.  An article by Jeffrey Helmreich illustrates this point well. 
He writes: 
Consider, for example, a medical injury after which a 
doctor says “I’m so sorry I delegated part of the surgery to 
someone I now realize was not really up to the job.”  Most 
state apology laws would offer no protection to such a 
statement, except perhaps not counting the “sorry” as a 
further admission in its own right.  One reason is that the 
doctor’s remarks factually confirm behavior that could 
contribute to negligence, and there is scarcely better 
evidence of liability than expert admissions by the liable 
party.163 
As this passage exemplifies, jurisdictions should not exclude fault-
admitting statements from admission into evidence.  By allowing full 
apology statutes to prohibit admissions of statements tantamount to a full 
confession, simply because the speaker uttered the magic words, “I’m 
sorry” before admitting liability, is dangerous policy and may significantly 
weaken an individual’s ability to prove their case.  The dangers of such an 
approach are recognized by the jurisdictions that have adopted apology 
protection.164  Over three quarters of the states that have created evidentiary 
protection for apologies have expressly limited such protection to situations 
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in which the apologizer does not admit fault.165  Further, the few states that 
provide protection for fault-admitting apologies have minimized these 
dangers by reducing the scope of protection to cover only the limited 
context of medical malpractice litigation.166 
iii. Striking a Balance 
If adoption of rules that will exclude full apologies from admission 
into evidence will provide a disservice to the justice system, how should 
legislatures capture the previously mentioned benefits apologizing can 
provide without running afoul of these detriments?  The answer lies in in 
the balance created by partial apologies. 
First, partial apologies statutes alleviate the primary concern 
implicit in full apology protection—that plaintiffs will be prevented from 
introducing evidence probative of fault.  This is because apologies that 
express only sympathy or benevolence are not probative of fault, or are 
only minimally so.167  For example, the Ohio Court of Appeals has noted, 
“when hearing that someone’s relative has died, it is common etiquette to 
say, ‘I’m sorry,’ but no one would take that as a confession of having 
caused the death.”168  Thus, by ensuring that plaintiffs are able to use the 
portions of apologies that express admission of fault, the law will not be 
harmed by excluding other sympathy-expressing portions of apologies. 
Second, while partial apologies undoubtedly do not provide the 
level of emotional and psychological advantages that full apologies and 
forgiveness provide, they still generate many helpful benefits.  Although 
some scholars have concerns that partial apology statements may be 
perceived as disingenuous in comparison with full apology statements,169 
and these concerns are legitimate, an expression of sympathy and 
benevolence is far better than a prohibition from offering condolences for 
fear that such a statement will be admitted in court.  When no one offers an 
apology, both parties are harmed.  The injured party’s anger and resentment 
builds, thus making him emotionally worse-off.  Likewise, the would-be 
apologizer suffers by losing the psychological relief forgiveness brings.  
Protection of partial apologies is the effective middle ground between the 
emotional and psychological healing full apologies provide and the harms 
no apology protection inflicts. 
Finally, partial apologies promote judicial economy by encouraging 
settlement.  While some commentators may argue a half-way approach 
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does more harm than good—observing studies such as Professor 
Robbennolt’s, in which the acceptance rate of an offer after a partial 
apology was lower than an offer after no apology170—such an outlook takes 
a pessimistic view of the empirical research.  Looking to Professor 
Robbennolt’s study as an example, the percentage of participants who 
rejected the offer outright when given a partial apology (25%) was far 
better than when given no apology at all (50%), and not considerably lower 
than the rate for full apologies (13%).171  Stated differently, even if a partial 
apology does not create an immediate settlement, it is effective at keeping 
the parties at the table. 
But even if the results of studies like Professor Robbennolt’s are 
accepted, and full apologies are empirically more likely to result in 
settlement than partial apologies, the balance achieved by partial apologies 
cannot be ignored.  Because partial apologies also alleviate the concern that 
probative evidence will not be admitted and provide legal and emotional 
benefits that are not available absent apologies, laws that encourage partial 
apologies serve as an excellent compromise between full apology statutes 
and jurisdictions that admit all apologetic statements.172 
III. A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 
EXCLUDING “PARTIAL APOLOGIES” 
Observing the successful balance between the legal, psychological, 
and emotional benefits that apologizing has with the detriments that 
protecting full apologies provides, this note proposes an amendment to the 
Federal Rules of Evidence that grants evidentiary protection for partial 
apologies. This note envisions incorporating such an amendment by 
borrowing language from the state evidentiary rules discussed at length 
above and joining these rules with current FRE 409. Rule 409 presently 
bars the admission of evidence regarding offers to pay or payments of 
medical, hospital, or similar expenses when offered as proof of the payer’s 
(or offeror’s) liability for the injury.173  FRE 409 is a natural place to 
incorporate a partial apology amendment because an offer to pay someone’s 
medical expenses after an accident is quite frequently accompanied by an 
apology. Though, the amendment will not change substantively if it is 
added elsewhere. 
However, for purposes of this note the proposed Rule 409 would 
read, in its entirety, as follows: 
(a) Offers to Pay Medical and Similar Expenses. Evidence 
of furnishing, promising to pay, or offering to pay medical, 
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hospital, or similar expenses resulting from an injury is not 
admissible to prove liability for the injury. 
(b) Expressions of Sympathy or Benevolence. The portion 
of statements, writings, or benevolent gestures expressing 
sympathy or a general sense of benevolence relating to any 
loss, pain, suffering, or death of a person involved in an 
accident, and made, at any time, to that person or to the 
family of that person, shall be inadmissible as evidence of 
liability in a civil action. 
(c) Exceptions. A statement of fault that is part of, or in 
addition to, any of the above shall not be inadmissible 
because of this Rule.174 
There are several portions of proposed Rule 409 that warrant 
further discussion and explanation.  First, the amendment specifically 
includes the words “at any time” to alleviate potential confusion as to the 
scope of the rule.  While FRE 408 necessarily limits exclusion to occasions 
in which there is a compromise negotiation as to a disputed claim,175 
proposed Rule 409(b) would apply regardless of whether the expression of 
sympathy or benevolence occurs in mediation, at a settlement negotiation, 
or on the side of the highway following a traffic accident. 
Second, the proposed amendment applies only in civil cases in 
which there has been an “accident,” and in which the benevolent statement 
relates to the loss, pain, suffering, or death of a person involved in the 
accident.  Most of the state statutory provisions used to model this proposed 
amendment specifically define the term “accident” as “an occurrence 
resulting in injury or death to one or more persons which is not the result of 
willful action by a party.”176  Proposed Rule 409(b) does not contain such a 
definition because this definition would preclude expressions of 
benevolence in which a person did not either physically or emotionally 
suffer injury or die as a result of such injury.  Specifically, the proposed 
amendment allows for the possibility of apologetic statements that relate to 
economic or proprietary harm to be excluded as well.  This is further seen 
by the proposed amendment’s inclusion of the intentionally vague coverage 
of, “the portion of statements . . . relating to any loss.” 
                                                 
 174. The language of section (a) was incorporated directly from the previous Rule 409, 
while sections (b) and (c) were adapted from the following statutes and rule of evidence, 
which are virtually identical: FLA. STAT. § 90.4026 (2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, 
§ 23D (2014); TENN. R. EVID. 409.1; WASH. REV. CODE § 5.66.010 (2014). 
 175. FED. R. EVID. 408. 
 176. See FLA. STAT. § 90.4026; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 23D; TENN. R. EVID. 
409.1; WASH. REV. CODE § 5.66.010. 
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Third, proposed Rule 409(b) applies only to benevolent or 
sympathetic statements made to the person injured by an accident, or the 
family member of a person injured by an accident.  This language envisions 
an apologizer not only being able to express sympathy to the one that he has 
directly harmed, but to those he has indirectly harmed – i.e. the family of 
the injured party.  Once again, several states’ statutory provisions provided 
a list of individuals who would be included in the definition of family, but 
because jurisdictions may differ on who should be included in this list, this 
amendment is intentionally silent on this matter.177 
Fourth, proposed Rule 409(b) only excludes evidence of a 
benevolent statement, writing, or gesture if it is being offered to prove 
liability.  If such a statement was offered for some other reason, such as to 
show the affect it had on the recipient, the Rule would not prevent its 
admission. 
Finally, as expected, proposed Rule 409(c) provides an exception 
for a statement of fault that is made as a part of, or in addition to any 
statement of benevolence or sympathy.  In such a scenario, the statement of 
fault remains admissible.  However, the portions of the statement 
expressing sympathy or benevolence would still be inadmissible, if such 
portions are capable of separation. Additionally, the exception in section (c) 
is listed separately from section (b) and, as such, intentionally affects 
section (a), the portion containing the original Rule 409.  This expressly 
codifies a portion of original Rule 409’s advisory committee notes which 
reads, “A statement of liability made in conjunction with such an offer is 
not rendered inadmissible by Rule 409.”178  This is made possible due to the 
compatible nature of the two provisions. 
CONCLUSION 
This note’s proposed amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence 
is not perfect. However, this amendment was crafted with the policies and 
approaches of state apology statutes in mind.  Consistent with Justice 
Brandeis’ characterization, these states have served as a laboratory, 
implementing “novel social and economic experiments without risk to the 
rest of the country.”179  In the laboratory of the states, the “partial apology 
experiment” has proven to be a successful balance between allowing 
evidence probative of fault and encouraging apologies.  This success is 
evident by the vast number of states who followed Massachusetts lead by 
creating apology protection statutes of their own.  In keeping with this trend 
of protecting some, but not all, apologies from being admitted into 
evidence, jurisdictions will likely continue to adopt similar protections.  
This note proposes that the Federal courts become one of these jurisdictions 
                                                 
 177. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1160 (West 2014); FLA. STAT. § 90.4026. 
 178. FED. R. EVID. 409 advisory committee’s notes. 
 179. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932). 
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by adopting an amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence allowing for 
partial apologies. 
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